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Abstract: The Consistent Histories (CH) formalism aims at a quantum mechanical
framework for the universe as a whole. CH stresses the importance of histories for
quantum mechanics, as opposed to measurements, and maintains that a satisfactory
formulation of quantum mechanics allows one to assign probabilities to alternative his-
tories of the universe. It further proposes that each realm, that is, each set of histories
to which probabilities can be assigned, provides a valid quantum-mechanical account,
but that different realms can be mutually incompatible. Finally, some of its proponents
offer an “evolutionary” explanation of our existence in the universe and of our prefer-
ence for quasiclassical descriptions of nature. The present work questions the validity
of claims offered by CH proponents asserting that it solves many interpretational prob-
lems in quantum mechanics. In particular, we point out that the interpretation of the
framework leaves vague two crucial points, namely, whether realms are fixed or chosen
and the link between measurements and histories. Our claim is that by doing so, CH
overlooks the main interpretational problems of quantum mechanics. Furthermore, we
challenge the evolutionary explanation offered and we critically examine the proposed
notion of a realm-dependent reality.
1 Introduction
The Consistent Histories approach to quantum mechanics, developed by Griffiths and
further elaborated by Gell-Mann, Hartle and Omnes, aims at a quantum-mechanical
framework which, in sharp contrast with the standard interpretation of quantum me-
chanics, dispenses with the notion of measurement and the distinction between the
observer and what is observed. In particular, it is a proposal for a formulation of
quantum mechanics applicable to the universe as a whole. CH stresses the importance
of histories for quantum mechanics, as opposed to measurements, and posits that a
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satisfactory formulation of quantum mechanics should be one that allows the assign-
ment of probabilities to alternative histories of the universe. The central problem that
it must overcome, however, is that not all histories can be assigned probabilities so it
provides an observer-independent criterion for deciding which sets of histories can be so
endowed, and it supplies, for the appropriate cases, rules to compute the corresponding
probabilities.
The version of CH developed in [3, 4], which will be the subject of this paper, relies
heavily on the notion of a realm. A realm is a set of coarse-grained histories to which
probabilities can be assigned. According to the point of view exposed in the above
cited works, each realm provides a valid quantum-mechanical account of the historical
development of a given system. However, the peculiarities of quantum theory often
allow for different realms to be mutually incompatible. The view is then that quantum-
mechanical statements are meaningful only relative to a particular realm. Moreover,
the approach maintains that the standard, Copenhagen-type, measurement situation
is nothing more than a special case of setting for which the CH formalism allows for
probabilities to be assigned. Consequently, a central claim of the proposal is that the
standard interpretation of quantum mechanics must be seen as a limiting case of the
CH framework. References [3, 4] also use the CH formalism to offer an “evolutionary”
explanation for the existence in the universe of complex adaptive systems, and, in
particular, of information gathering and utilizing systems (IGUSes), like humans, and
for their almost exclusive preference for quasiclassical descriptions of nature.
The present work offers a critical assessment of these ideas and in particular of
claims explicitly made in [3, 4], asserting that the CH formalism accomplishes the
resolution of many of the problems of interpretation present in standard quantum me-
chanics. Specifically, we point out that the interpretation proposed in these works
leaves unresolved two crucial points, namely, whether humans and other IGUSes can
“choose” or not a realm, and the link between measurements and histories. As such, the
proposal ends up overlooking the main interpretational problems of quantum mechan-
ics. Moreover, we will argue that there seems to be no possible satisfactory resolution
of those issues within CH. Furthermore, we will critically examine the evolutionary
explanation offered in these works and the proposal of a realm-dependent reality.
The plan for this manuscript is as follows. Section 2 presents the CH formalism and
section 3 describes its interpretation developed in [3, 4]. Section 4 then reviews the main
objections that have been raised against CH. Section 5 examines [5], a text written with
the expressed purpose of clarifying the CH formalism, and section 6 presents what are
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taken to be severe remaining conceptual problems in the CH formulation of quantum
mechanics. Section 7 closes with some final thoughts.
2 Consistent Histories
The notion of measurement and the distinction between the observer and what is
observed play central roles in the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics. These
features render such interpretation unfit to be applied to closed systems (e.g. ones that
include observers) and, in particular, inadequate for clear applicability of quantum
theory to cosmology. The CH formulation of quantum mechanics, in contrast, aims
at a quantum-mechanical framework for closed systems and, specifically, at one that
is applicable to the universe as a whole. The formalism is also considered by its
proponents as a completion of the Everettian program, or as the “right way” to develop
Everett’s ideas.
The CH formalism holds that the most general objective of quantum mechanics is
the prediction of probabilities for time-histories of a system. In order to achieve this,
it provides an observer-independent criterion to tell what sets of alternative histories
of a given system can be assigned probabilities and allows for these probabilities to be
computed. Lets see how all these is done.
The formalism takes as inputs an initial state |ψ〉 and some dynamics dictated by
a Hamiltonian operator Hˆ. These are supposed to be given by an external theory
and, in the case of cosmology, by a fundamental cosmological theory. The formalism
then introduces the notion of an exhaustive and exclusive set of yes/no alternatives
(or facts) at a time. Such sets are represented, in the Heisenberg picture, by a set of
projection operators:
{Pα(t)}, α = 1, 2, 3, ... (1)
such that ∑
α
Pα(t) = 1, and Pα(t)Pβ(t) = δαβPα(t). (2)
The first of the equations above implements the exhaustiveness of these projections,
the second the exclusiveness. From these sets, the notion of a set of histories, which is
a time-sequence of sets of (exhaustive and exclusive) facts, is constructed. The sets of
histories are represented by
{P 1α1(t1)}, {P 2α2(t2)}, ..., {P nαn(tn)}, at times t1 < t2 < ... < tn. (3)
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Individual histories are then assembled by selecting a particular sequence of alterna-
tives, (α¯1, α¯2, ..., α¯n), one of each set. Such histories are represented by the correspond-
ing chain of projections Cα¯ ≡ P nα¯n(tn)...P 1α¯1(t1) and each history gets assigned a branch
state vector: |ψα¯〉 = Cα¯|ψ〉.
Sets of histories are generally coarse-grained because alternatives are not specified
at all times and because the projections involved can be projections onto subspaces
of dimension greater than one. Operations of fine- and coarse-graining can be defined
on sets of histories by, for example, removing or adding sets of alternatives, or by
combining or refining the projections.
The next step in the formalism is to assign probabilities to individual histories
within a set, but it turns out that not all sets of histories can be assigned probabilities.
That can be done only when there is negligible interference between branches of the
set
〈ψα|ψβ〉 ≈ 0, (4)
a condition that ensures that the assigned probabilities (approximately) satisfy the ax-
ioms of probability. Sets satisfying the condition above are said to (medium) decohere.
According to the formalism, these are the only sets for which quantum mechanics
makes predictions, with (approximate) probabilities for different branches given by
p(α¯) = ‖Cα¯|ψ〉‖2. A decoherent set of alternative coarse-grained histories is known as
a realm.
With the formalism in place, one can now extract information from the theory.
Then, given data d at time t0, represented by a projection operator Pd(t0), predictions
for the probability of the future history αf are given by
p(αf |d) =
‖CαfPd(t0)|ψ〉‖2
‖Pd(t0)|ψ〉‖2 , (5)
with Cαf an exhaustive set of alternative histories to the future of t0. Similarly, retro-
dictions for the past history βp are given by
p(αf |d) = ‖Pd(t0)Cβp |ψ〉‖
2
‖Pd(t0)|ψ〉‖2 , (6)
with Cβp an exhaustive set of alternative histories to the past of t0.
Recapitulating, the most important features of the CH formalism are i) the fact that
it uses histories, as opposed to instantaneous states, as central descriptive tools for the
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theory; ii) that it implements temporal evolution only via Schrödinger’s dynamics,
without (at least explicit) mention of the projection (or collapse) postulate; and iii)
that it provides an observer-independent criterion for deciding which sets of histories
can be assigned probabilities and gives rules to tell what these probabilities are.
3 An Interpretation of the Formalism
In this section we will explore three core aspects of the interpretation of the CH formal-
ism given in [3, 4]: the notion of incompatible realms, the relation between the concept
of a quasiclassical realm and the existence of complex creatures such as ourselves and
the way in which the formalism is supposed to imply the standard interpretation of
quantum mechanics. We will discuss these in order.
3.1 Inconsistent realms
As we saw in the previous section, a realm is a set of histories for which probabilities
can be consistently assigned. It turns out that, given a generic system, many different
realms can be defined. Furthermore, the theory does not distinguish between all these
different realms; it treats all of them on an equal footing. However, not all realms
are compatible in the sense that two different realms of the same system may lead to
contradictory conclusions.
Lets see how this works in detail. We start by defining two realms as incompatible
if there is no common finer-grained realm (which by definition must exclude non-
negligible interferences) of which they are both coarse-grainings. Then, it can be shown
(see [6]) that using two incompatible realms, both compatible with the same given data,
it is possible to arrive at inconsistent stories of what actually happened. That is, it
is possible to retrodict, with certainty in each realm, two inconsistent facts about the
past. Therefore, one is forced to conclude that, according to CH, there is no unique
past given present data.
References [3, 4] clearly recognize this complication, and in order to avoid inconsis-
tencies impose the following rule: inferences may not be drawn by combining probabil-
ities from incompatible realms. Making such kind of deductions is just something you
are not allowed to do while using the formalism.
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3.2 Quasiclassical domains and IGUSes
A quasiclassical domain is defined in [3] as a realm that is maximally refined (in the
sense that if you further fine-grain it, it ceases to decohere) and that contains individual
histories exhibiting as much patterns of classical correlation in time as possible. The
world we perceive is supposed to be the foremost example of such a domain. In addition,
humans are taken to be complex adaptive systems, and, in particular, special types of
IGUSes. The most important characteristic of an IGUS is considered to be the fact
that it uses a (maybe rudimentary) physical theory in order to make predictions about
its surrounding environment.
With these two ideas in place, it is sustain that the existence of IGUSes is to
be explained in evolutionary terms: they evolved to make predictions because it is
adaptive to do so and they focus on quasiclassical domains because these present enough
regularity to permit predictions by rudimentary methods. Then, this is supposed to
explain why, among all the possible realms that the CH formalism allows, we as humans
experience only a very particular type, namely a quasiclassical one.1
3.3 Recovering the standard interpretation
In order to show that the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics is contained
in the CH formulation, reference [3] starts by defining a measurement as a correlation
between values of operators of a quasiclassical domain. Then, the claim is that this
implies that the standard, Copenhagen-type, measurement situation, i.e., one with a
system, a measuring apparatus and an observer, is only a special case of setting in
which the CH formalism allows for probabilities to be computed. Furthermore, it is
argued that the probabilities assigned through the CH formalism coincide with the
ones one would obtain using the standard interpretation. Consequently, the conclusion
is that the standard interpretation is nothing but a special or limiting case of CH.
4 Main Objections
In this section we will briefly review some of the main objections that have been raised
throughout the years against the CH formulation of quantum mechanics. In particular,
1It is not clear if there exits just one quasiclassical realm. If more than one exists we should ask
whether different IGUS of classes of IGUSes could possibly perceive different ones.
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we will mention four important criticisms of CH that some people have considered
devastating.
The first objection we will mention is related to something we have already dis-
cussed: the fact that the theory allows for contrary inferences (see [6]). As we saw
in the previous section, by fixing present data and choosing incompatible past realms,
the formalism allows to retrodict contradictory propositions. In fact, as shown there,
one can retrodict contradictory facts each with probability one. As we noted above,
in order to handle the situation, references [3, 4] include in the formalism a rule for-
bidding the simultaneous use of incompatible realms in order to make inferences. The
objection then consists in claiming that the addition of such a rule constitutes an ad
hoc solution, void of physical motivations.
The second objection we will consider is the fact that the theory appears to lack
predictive power (see [2]). The point is that, in the same way as different past realms
can tell different stories of what happened, different future realms can tell different
stories of what will happen. Therefore, predictions can only be made conditional on
a choice of realm. This, together with the fact that the formalism treats all realms
on a par, i.e., it offers no procedure of singling out any particular one, seems to imply
that there is no way of extracting usable information from the formalism. One might
argue that once one knows which experiment is being performed, one can fix the realm
accordingly. However, taking this view would bring us back to square one because the
issue would again be to determine “under what conditions does the theory specify that
a certain experiment is being performed”. In other words, we would need to solve the
measurement problem of quantum mechanics.
The third criticism has to do with the fact that, generically, quasiclassical histories
cease to be quasiclassical very abruptly (see [2]). That is, almost all histories that are
quasiclassical up to a point in time, stop being quasiclassical in the future. Therefore,
the theory is unable to explain the observed persistence of quasiclassicality.
The last objection we will mention is related to the fact that the CH formalism
delivers approximate probabilities (see [1]). The problem is that the CH probabilities
are approximate but in a very atypical manner. A common way of introducing ap-
proximate probabilities into a theory would be through a mechanism which generates
results very close to some unknown, but actual probabilities. That would not be that
troublesome as long as the formalism guarantees that discrepancies remain small. How-
ever, CH probabilities are approximate in a different, much more problematic, fashion
because its approximate character implies that they fail, as defined, to obey the ax-
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ioms of probability. It is unclear, then, that the numbers provided by the theory can
actually be interpreted as genuine probabilities.
Before moving on, we would like to close this section with a quote that nicely
encapsulates the sentiment of critics of the CH formulation, and in particular of the
position in [3, 4]:
“[they] seem - despite much critical probing - unclear on, or uncommitted
to taking a stance on, precisely what, if anything, in the theory corresponds
to objective external reality” [7].
Proponents of CH, on the other hand, believe that all of these issues can be satisfactorily
addressed within the CH formulation. In the next section we will discuss [5], a recent
paper that embarks in the project of clarifying the CH formalism and of overcoming
such criticisms.
5 Quantum Physics and Human Language
Inspired by the criticisms of the previous section, [5] attempts to clarify the conceptual
difficulties of the CH formalism. In order to do so, it argues that most (if not all) of
the complications arise from shortcomings in our everyday language. Therefore, the
proposal is to explore a possible source of tension between domains in which human
language evolved, i.e., quasiclassical realms, and those to which it can be applied, like
quantum physics for example. The conclusion reached in that work is that such tension
results in the fact that human languages contain excess baggage that, in order to be
useful for physics, must be discarded. As prime examples of excess baggage, reference
[5] considers the use of the verb ‘to happen’ in special relativity (SR) and in quantum
mechanics and of the word ‘reality’ in quantum mechanics.
Let first consider briefly what [5] has to say about the colloquial use of ‘to happen’
in SR. On the one hand, it observes that human language assumes an absolute division
of the world into past, present and future. Therefore, it allows constructions of the
form: ‘A happened before B’ or ‘C happened at the same time as D’. On the other
hand, it points out that, according to SR, such absolute division does not exist since the
partition of spacetime into past, present and future, depends on the observer. There-
fore, absolute statements about the temporal order of events cannot be formulated.
To resolve the conflict, the text proposes either to drop all constructions involving ‘to
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happen’ in a special relativistic contexts, or to use it but with qualifications, as in ‘A
happened before B, in such and such frame of reference’.
As for the use of ‘to happen’ in CH, [5] remembers that questions, answers, pre-
dictions or retrodictions need the specification of a realm in order to be meaningful.
It says, for example, “If someone asks you ‘What happened yesterday?’ you should
strictly speaking respond with the question ‘In what realm’.” However, it recognizes
that the colloquial use of ‘to happen’ assumes that only one realm exists so its use
must be reformed. Similarly for the use of ‘reality’ since human language assumes that
there is only one, but different realms have different notions of ‘reality’. Therefore,
when using the words ‘real’ or ‘reality’ it is necessary to specify which realm is being
considered.
In order to understand how all this is supposed to address (at least some of) the
criticisms of the previous section, it is necessary to distinguish in [5] two central claims.
The first one consist in holding what could be called a reality relativism, i.e., the
ontological claim that the notion of reality, or what is real, is meaningful only relative
to a realm. This is of course is a strong assertion. The second claim maintains that
our difficulty for accepting the first one arises from deficiencies in human language.
Reference [5] introduces some intriguing ideas that might work towards a solution of
some of the problems mentioned in the previous section. For example, the reality-
relativism claim helps in addressing the accusation of ad hocness for the incompatible-
realms rule since, if reality is indeed relative to a realm, it would make no sense to
combine inferences from incompatible realms (that would correspond, according to the
proposal, to a mixing of different realities!). It also helps addressing the apparent
lack of predictive power because it justifies the idea that it isn’t correct to demand
predictions from the theory without fixing a realm (without a realm, again, according
to the proposal, there simply is no world or reality to be described!).
What about the other two objections raised in the previous section? With respect
to the approximate probabilities problem,[5] has nothing to say. The position in [3, 4],
however, is that probabilities are to be understood pragmatically. That is, they should
be used up to a standard of accuracy sufficient for all practical purposes. Furthermore,
it is claimed that any standard of accuracy can be achieved by considering sufficiently
coarse-grained histories. With respect to the lack of persistence of quasiclasicality, [5]
also doesn’t say much, but the position is that the problem is solved with the evolution-
ary argument offered. The idea is that, even though must quasicalssical histories stop
being so in the future, IGUSes are in a way trapped in them. Reference [5] offers ways
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out of some of the main objections agains CH. Nevertheless, it also uncovers what we
take to be a number of severe outstanding conceptual problems for the CH approach.
We will consider these next.
6 Remaining Objections
In this section we will present four objections against CH that, we believe, turn the
formalism, at least in the form advanced in [3, 4, 5], essentially unsustainable. The
first of these objections questions the coherence of the proposal of a realm-dependent
reality and concludes, among other things, that by not providing a mechanism for realm
selection, the scheme looses its cohesion. Next, we examine the idea that the initial
state of the universe, and its dynamics, should be provided by an external theory and
test the consistency of the proposal. After that, we challenge the claim that standard
quantum mechanics is contained in CH, and we close by dissecting the evolutionary
explanation for the existence of IGUSes and their relation to quasiclassical realms.
As we saw in the previous section, [5] quite explicitly proposes a reality relativism.
The text is asking us to consider the idea that reality, or what is real, is relative
to a realm. There is no doubt that the idea of a reality relativism is controversial.
However, here, instead of scrutinizing the idea itself, we would like to first enquire if,
as [5] asserts, our problem for accepting it emerges from the tension between colloquial
language and physics language. Then we will go on to question the consistency of the
whole proposal.
First of all, the history of science is full of examples of concepts that at some point
are thought of being absolute but that turn out to be relative. A great example of
this, specifically mentioned in [5], is the fact that in SR the order of events in time
is not absolute, as believed within Newtonian mechanics, but relative on the frame
of reference. Then, according to SR, it could be the case that for some observer A
happens before than B, for another A and B are simultaneous and for a third one
A happens after B; all these even though in Newtonian mechanics temporal order is
absolute. Therefore, if true, the reality-relativism proposal would surely not be the
first time science discovers something to be relative. Furthermore, human language
seems perfectly capable of dealing with relative concepts; we do it all the time with
notions like big, far, cold, etc. Therefore, we fail to see how the uneasiness with the idea
of a realm-dependent reality could have anything to do with shortcomings or excess
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baggage in human language; this is clearly not a language problem but an ontologic
one.
Another aspect where there is a breakdown in the analogy between SR and CH is
the following: in the case of SR, the description of nature is done without any funda-
mental notion of (absolute) simultaneity. However, the description offers a picture that
explains the usefulness and validity of a relative (observer-dependent) version of such a
notion. In order to do this, SR presents a model of nature consisting of a 4-dimensional
manifold, specifically R4, endowed with a pseudo-Riemannian flat metric, filled with
curves that represent the world lines of particles and observers (the scheme also allows
the incorporation of classical fields). From all these, the notion of simultaneity associ-
ated to each observer can be recovered in terms of observer-independent constructions
that can be made using the world line of the observer in question and the properties
of null geodesics (which represent light). One can then, for example, describe the light
signals arriving to an observer and describe what she perceives, without recourse to
the notion of absolute simultaneity. As a result, the model of reality offered by SR,
and its internal self-consistency, are ensured by the mathematical self-constancy of the
structure of the manifold and the curves within it.
The trouble with the CH approach is that, in contrast with SR, it offers us no
unified and self-consistent model of the world, but only a concatenation of different
pictures and a rule that instruct us “not to use two of them simultaneously.” Instead,
one would hope for a scheme that presents a unified characterization of nature and
that it be such that the rules about the use of different sectors of the theory are seen
to emerge directly from that picture.
What about the proposal itself for a realm-dependent reality? As we said before,
it is, no doubt, a controversial claim. However, before considering the idea seriously,
it is necessary to check if it is internally consistent and in accord with the experiences
we want to understand within the frame provided by the theory. One of the main
problems in this respect is that it is not at all clear how are the IGUSes supposed to
fix or select a specific realm among all the possible options offered by the formalism.
Of course, this is an essential step to make sense of the theory. However, the formalism
does not explicitly state any mechanism for doing so. Furthermore, reading the sources
does not help much in clarifying the situation:
“...we could adopt a subjective point of view... and say that the IGUS
“chooses” its coarse graining of histories and, therefore, “chooses” a partic-
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ular quasiclassical domain... It would be better, however, to say that the
IGUS evolves to exploit a particular quasiclassical domain or set of such
domains.” [3].
It is not clear, then, weather an IGUS (or a class of IGUSes) chooses a realm, or weather
it is the realm that limits or constrains the possibility of existence, and characteristics,
of IGUSes dwelling within it. In any case, there are just two basic options: either
IGUSes can or cannot choose realms. The problem is that neither option seems to takes
us to satisfactory conclusions. If selecting a specific realm is beyond our capacities as
IGUSes, then talk of multiple realms seems extravagant and serves no real purpose
in the theory (other realms being empirically inaccessible). Furthermore, if it is not
the IGUS that does the choosing, what is the entity or circumstance that does it and
how does it do it? On the other hand, if an IGUS can choose a realm, proponents of
the formalism owe us an explanation of how this could be so,2 especially after noticing
that it involves fixing projections everywhere in the universe, and at all times, and,
moreover considering that the corresponding projections might radically affect our
current experience, or even alter the fact that we exist in the present, (see [8]). The
problem then is not only that a mechanism for selecting a realm is missing; the problem
is that the formalism seems to lack the resources for providing it.
A related complication is the following. Proponents of CH maintain that a realm
must be chosen according to the questions one is trying to answer and the predictions
one is interested in obtaining. However, the issue that concerns us here goes in a
different direction. We are not interested in a recipe for applying the formalism in order
to come up with predictions for experiments in which we can take for granted a myriad
of things - like a distinct system, a measuring apparatus, well defined observables,
observers, etc. We are rather interested in evaluating the formalism as a theory of all
this things together, which of course is the central motivation for taking it seriously
in the first place. We believe then that there are two different levels of discourse that
get entangled, one is about how IGUSes use the theory to make predictions and the
other is about what the theory tells us with respect to the nature and functioning of
the world as a whole. We also believe that it is of extreme importance, for an adequate
assessment of the CH approach, to always be clear about the distinction between these
two levels of discourse. Actually, regarding this last issue, one has to wonder how, if
2Recall that we already indicated that one cannot argue that the experimental set up is what
determines the choice because then the issue would again be to specify under what conditions does
the theory indicate that a set up counts as an experiment.
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our world is in fact accurately described in terms of the CH formalism, could IGUSes
such as ourselves ever be able to come up with quantum theory in general, and with
the CH approach to it in particular.
The second objection we would like to mention is related to the idea that the CH
formalism takes as inputs an initial state |ψ〉 and a Hamiltonian Hˆ. These objects,
which are necessary for making predictions and retrodictions (see equations 5 and 6),
are supposed to be fixed and absolute, i.e., realm-independent. However, if the idea
of a realm-dependent reality is taken seriously, it is far from clear how one could have
access to this absolute elements. In other words, how are we supposed to choose initial
conditions for a theory that holds that the present does not uniquely determine the
past? As a way out of this state of affairs, [3, 4] insist that we need to construct a
separate and external theory for choosing the initial conditions. However, if the past
really is relative, nothing at all that we observe can ever count as evidence for such an
external theory. That is, we cannot, even in principle, test such ideas about the initial
state.
We turn next to two related issues, both having to do with the treatment of the
concept of measurements in CH. The first is the way in which the formalism is supposed
to contain standard quantum theory and the second is the fact that the proposal in
[3, 4] fails to establish a clear link between actual (physical) measurements and the
projection operators of the (mathematical) formalism. Let us expand on this.
As we saw in section 3, the approach of [3, 4] sustains that the CH formalism
incorporates Copenhagen quantum theory as a limiting scenario. If this is true, it of
course implies that CH is consistent with experiments (to the extent that standard
quantum mechanics is). However, the situation is a bit more complicated than what
is suggested there. The first problem is that the scheme offers no way to decide, even
after (somehow) fixing a realm, what is the status of the different histories within it.
Once again we see two available options:
1. Only one of the histories within the chosen realm is actual, in which case the
formalism is descriptively incomplete since, as it lacks a projection postulate,
does not offer a mechanism to explain the preference for the chosen history from
among the all the available choices. It does not ascribe to the actual story any
ontological status, and thus no special role whatsoever.
2. All the histories within the chosen realm are actual, in which case there are
two problems. On the one hand, it is not possible to interpret as probabilities
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the numbers generated by the framework since all options are realized. On the
other, it sharply conflicts with our everyday experience of obtaining determined
outcomes when we perform measurements, (these of course are the standard
objections against many-world scenarios).
Another important omission in [3, 4] with respect to measurements is that, as we
briefly mentioned before, the proposal does not make explicit what is the relation
between measurements performed by IGUSes and the projection operators of the for-
malism. That is, there is no specification of how are we to connect the mathematical
formalism provided with experimental practices, (Born’s rule plays this role in the
standard interpretation but of course the idea of any alternative to the Copenhagen
interpretation is to improve upon it). The only rule that the formalism provides is the
following: realms are to be chosen according to the questions one is trying to answer.
The issue we would like to examine then is how one is supposed to apply this dictum in
practice. That is, given a standard measurement situation, which is exactly the realm
one must use?
An initial (and partial) response to the question raised above could be that the
realm must contain, as a minimum, a projection corresponding to the measurement
to be realized. This, however, is deeply problematic because, as we said before, the
CH formalism does not specify under what conditions one is allowed to conclude that
a measurement is taking place (in other words, the measurement problem once again
crops up).
The situation is even worse for the rest of the projections that comprise the realm
(remember that realms contain sets of projections at various times). Clearly, these
cannot be associated with measurements performed by IGUSes because for a measure-
ment situation to arise, specific projections must had happened early on in the history
of the universe, before any IGUS was around to perform measurements. The remaining
option is to disassociate the projections of the formalism with measurement but this
solution is also unacceptable because the formalism lacks resources to do so. That is,
it does not posses any other element that could do the job.
The last critique we will offer questions the viability of the proposed evolutionary
explanation for the existence of IGUSes and their relation to quasiclassical realms. As
we saw in section 3 the idea is that it is evolutionarily advantageous to be able to make
predictions and so IGUSes are selected for because they are good at it. Furthermore,
they evolve in quasiclassical realms because these are the environments that present
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enough regularities so that predictions can be generated. There are, however, serious
problems with this reasoning.
Lets start by asserting that evolutionary theory can minimally be described by the
following: impact of the environment on reproductive success. Therefore, its essential
elements include: a varied initial population, an external environment, heredity and
selection. However, none of these elements seem to be present in the CH context. In
particular, there is no external given framework for IGUSes to evolve since, according
to the proposed explanation, the environment (i.e., the realm) is an essential part of
what is supposed to be adaptively selected (the result purportedly being a quasiclassical
realm). In other words, one cannot argue that evolution takes place, according to the
standard paradigm of natural selection, unless one can argue that things do occur:
that a failure to obtain resources results in death, or that systems that are unfit do
not reproduce, etc. Those rules presuppose a quasiclassical realm, and it is thus clear
that they cannot be used to argue that they play a role in selecting one such realm
over something else.
In contrast, we note that the anthropic principle can be stated as follows: features
of the world are what they are because, otherwise, we wouldn’t be here to remark on it.
This, we believe, sounds a lot closer to what is being proposed in [3, 4] since, in effect,
what is being argued is that we experience a quasiclassical realm because it is the only
one that allows for IGUSes like ourselves to exist. The purpose of this observation
is not to question the usefulness or validity of the anthropic principle, this is not the
place for doing so. The objective is to demonstrate that what is presented in [3, 4] as
an evolutionary argument actually is more accurately described as an invocation of the
anthropic principle.
Before moving on, we would like to reevaluate, in the light of the contents of this
section, the effectiveness of the arguments offered in [5] in responding the objections
presented in section 4. As was mentioned above, the idea in [5] is to use the notion
of a realm-dependent reality in order answer the first two objections offered: the pres-
ence of contradictory inferences and the apparent lack of predictive power. However,
if the arguments given here are solid, the proposed notion of a realm-dependent real-
ity is not well defined and so the objections remain unanswered. Similarly, the lack
of persistence of quasiclasicality is supposed to be addressed through the suggested
evolutionary argument but if the latter is problematic, the objection endures. Regard-
ing the approximate probabilities problem, as we already mentioned, reference [5] has
nothing to say. Therefore, we conclude that all of the issues introduced in section 4
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remain problematic.
7 Conclusions
There is no doubt that the attempt to develop a generalization of standard quantum
theory, applicable to closed systems, is an important enterprise; even an essential one
when viewed as a foundational step in the construction of quantum theories of cos-
mology. It is also a very interesting and worthwhile project to explore whether purely
unitary quantum theory can be cast into a scientifically adequate theory. That is, if a
version of quantum theory where temporal evolution is implemented purely in terms
of Schrödinger’s equation, with no mention of a projection postulate, can be made
compatible with our experience of definite measurement results and a stable character-
ization of the world and the laws of nature. On the other hand, it is very likely that
the problems encountered while trying to apply quantum theory to the universe as a
whole arise not from our inability to interpret quantum theory, as advanced by CH
proponents, but from the (bold) assumption that quantum theory is universally valid.
In any case, before loosing hope on a theory as successful as quantum theory, we
think it is wise to explore how far it can be extended. The formulation of CH proposed
in [3, 4] surely is a brave attempt in this respect, unfortunately, at least in its present
form, it cannot be considered as truly satisfactory.
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